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ABSTRACT 
Between 1970 and 2009, India has overcome many infrastructural, market, and institutional challenges to 
transition from a dairy importing nation to the top producer in the world of both buffalo and goat milk, as 
well as the sixth largest producer of cow milk. In India, at least 100 million households are involved in 
farming and 70 million have dairy cattle.   
In India, dairy production is important for employment, income levels, and the nutritional quality 
of diets. Milk production in India is dominated by smallholder farmers including landless agricultural 
workers. For example, 80 percent of milk comes from farms with only two to five cows. A well-known 
smallholder dairy production initiative, Operation Flood, laid the foundation for a dairy cooperative 
movement that presently ensures returns on dairy investments to 13 million members. Operation Flood 
also advanced infrastructural improvements to enable the procurement, processing, marketing, and 
production of milk and to link India’s major metropolitan cities with dairy cooperatives nationwide. This 
intervention transformed the policy environment, brought significant technological advancements into the 
rural milk sector, established many village cooperatives, and oriented the dairy industry toward markets.   
Keywords:  Millions Fed, Food Security, Operation Flood, India, Dairy, NDDB, Dairy Cooperatives 
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  Tikku 2003  
Geographical Coverage   170 milksheds in 362 districts     NDDB Annual Reports 2005, 
2006, and 2007.  
Women/Pro-poor   73 percent of households were small,  
marginal, landless farmers  
3.7 million (2008);  
Over 25 percent of 
members;  
2700 cooperatives 
managed by all 
women management 
committee  
GOI 2008  
Incomes   Landless farmers’ incomes doubled;  
Annual milk supply profit: Rs 1,845  
Bonuses: Rs 400 (1985-86)  
  FAO Information Division 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Overview   
India, historically a milk-consuming country, was dependent on milk imports for decades. In fact, 50-60 
percent of the dairy industry’s total throughput in the 1950s and 1960s was externally produced (Aneja 
1994a). As such, a variety of development programs and interventions have targeted India’s dairy 
industry as a way of increasing production to meet domestic demand and in turn, combat food insecurity. 
Since 1970, India’s output of milk and milk products has increased faster (at a rate of 4.5 percent per year 
between 1970 and 2001) than crop output and has outpaced the world’s 1 percent annual rate of increase 
(Sharma and Gulati 2003).  As of the early part of the twenty-first century, milk and milk products were 
70.8 percent of the total output value of all livestock products in India and were the largest agricultural 
commodity category by value (Staal, Pratt, and Jabbar 2008b). These production increases were met 
between the early-1980s and late-1990s with a nearly twofold increase in aggregate milk consumption 
throughout India, a total summing up as 31 percent of all developing countries’ milk consumption and 13 
percent of the world’s total (Delgado 2003).  
By 2007, with more than 12 million milk producers, India had become one of the largest 
producers of buffalo, goat, and cow milk in the world— and milk was a bigger contributor to the nation’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) than rice. As milk production nearly tripled, India not only has become 
self-sufficient in milk but also an exporter of milk powder. Considering that India has a population of 
more than 1 billion people— of which at least 100 million households are farming households and 70 
million of them have dairy cattle—this increase in dairy production is of great consequence as it has 
improved employment, income levels, and the nutritional quality of diets. For instance, at least 20 percent 
of India’s agricultural economy is composed of dairying and approximately 70 percent of the rural 
population is involved in milk production. Importantly, milk production in India, as is true in many parts 
of Asia, is dominated by smallholder farmers, including landless agricultural workers, who rely primarily 
on family labor. To be precise, 80 percent of milk comes from farms with only two to five cows (Perumal 
et al. 2007, Morgan 2009a). (Annex 2). In short, although India has had to overcome many infrastructural, 
market, and institutional challenges in meeting domestic dairy demand, it now ranks with the United 
States, France, Pakistan and others as a major milk-producing nation (Figure 1.1).  2 
Figure 1.1. India and other major milk producing nations, 2008 
 
Sources: Calculated by author using data from Population Reference Bureau 2008 World Population Data Sheet and FAO 
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2.  AN INTRODUCTION TO OPERATION FLOOD 
India’s sizeable vegetarian population ensures a constant demand for dairy products and milk has been an 
integral part of the Indian diet for millennia. In India, there is a long-standing household tradition of 
keeping milch animals. Traditionally, draught animals have had many agricultural uses, including 
threshing and transportation, in addition to providing milk (Aneja 1994a, Perumal et al 2007). But 
population growth, economic development, a rise in income levels, and late twentieth-century 
urbanization presented India with challenges in meeting an increasing dairy demand given limited 
domestic production. For instance, as incomes have risen in India, milk demand has followed as well due 
to dairy’s relatively high-income elasticity: demand for milk in New Delhi alone increased by 50 percent 
between the mid-70s and mid-80s (Saxena 1997, Batra 1990). In the mid-twentieth century, the Kaira 
District Cooperative Milk Producers’ Union and its replications demonstrated that smallholder dairy 
cooperatives could improve milk supplies and smallholder income levels and in 1970, national efforts to 
scale up this process began with the implementation of Operation Flood by the National Dairy 
Development Board. Prior to this, government initiatives throughout India were unsuccessful in 
implementing a variety of strategies to modernize the national dairy sector.   
Operation Flood, a well-known smallholder dairy production initiative, laid the foundation for a 
dairy cooperative movement. India’s dairy industry is dominated by an unorganized, traditionally 
informal sector, which involves traders handling raw milk and traditional milk products—only 10-15 
percent of the market is formalized. As such, Operation Flood cooperatives actually produced and 
marketed only a small percentage of dairy (Munshi and Parikh 1994). Yet this integrated dairy 
development venture was critical to the industry’s overall evolution in India: it transformed the policy 
environment, brought significant technological advancements to the rural milk sector, established many 
village cooperatives, and oriented the dairy industry toward markets. While the cooperatives set up under 
Operation Flood accounted for only a small share of the milk procured and marketed in relation to total 
milk supply, Operation Flood should still be credited for the white revolution because it established a new 
policy environment friendly to smallholder farmers in the dairy sector (World Bank 2006).  
The intervention also has brought about infrastructural improvements to enable the production, 
processing, procurement, and marketing of milk throughout India Developing India’s best milk sheds.  
Operation Flood linked India’s major metropolitan cities with dairy cooperatives nationwide Many 
Indians benefited from this large-scale agricultural intervention, including small-scale dairy farmers, 
urban and rural consumers, and even landless milk producers. Furthermore, by increasing milk 
production, this cooperative scheme has enhanced food security for millions of people throughout India 
and improved employment, income levels, and the nutritional quality of diets.  Because the cooperatives 
processed an average of 30 million liters of milk daily and reached more than 9 million members, this 
livestock intervention also successfully reduced poverty, improved human health, and reduced 
malnutrition. Presently, this movement ensures returns on dairy investments to 13 million members of the 
cooperatives (NDDB 2009).   4 
3.  THE INTERVENTION: OPERATION FLOOD I, OPERATION FLOOD II, AND 
OPERATION FLOOD III  
There have been four main stages of India’s dairy development: pre-independence (before 1947), post 
independence/pre-Operation Flood (1950s-60s), Operation Flood and pre-reforms (1970s-80s), and post-
Operation Flood and post-reforms (1990s onwards) (Staal, Pratt, and Jabbar 2008b). In the pre-Operation 
Flood period India’s dairy industry and attempts to modernize it had been riddled with obstacles. The 
challenges and market constraints included an urban-focused production scheme (for example, a lack of 
market access to the market for many smallholders), lack of a method for procuring milk produced in 
rural areas, high transaction costs and the highly perishable nature of dairy, among others challenges. 
These challenges formed the impetus for dairy reforms in the 1970s (Banerjee 1994).    
The antecedent to the Operation Flood initiative was a milk producers’ private cooperative 
venture in Anand, Gujarat. In 1946 these milk producers organized themselves into a private cooperative 
called Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers’ Union Ltd India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri 
visited the cooperative and was impressed with the effectiveness and success of the dairy cooperative 
union in Gujarat. In 1965, the government of India established the National Dairy Development Board 
(NDDB) — a parastatal organization—and mandated that it replicate this Anand model of dairy 
cooperatives throughout India for the benefit of as large a number of farmers as possible. This dream of 
the then Prime Minister manifested itself into the setting up of the National Dairy Development Board 
which conceived a program ‘Operation Flood’ to flood India with milk through a sophisticated 
procurement system using rural production to satisfy urban demand.    
The NDDB assumed responsibility for setting up cooperatives and provided technical support for 
planning, farmer extension services, engineering, dairy technology, veterinary services, and nutrition for 
fostering dairy development.  Verghese Kurien, General Manager of KDCMPUL later named as Anand 
Milk Union Limited (AMUL), was appointed by the government as the founding Chair and transformed 
the idea of cooperative dairying into reality.  In 1970, the Indian Dairy Corporation (IDC) was established 
to manage financial aspects of Operation Flood, such as receiving and monetizing donated commodities: 
the profits generated from selling the donated commodities were used to finance the Operation Flood 
program.  Later, the two entities merged, and today the NDDB continues to fund and provide technical 
assistance to cooperatives throughout India.  The Institute of Rural Management (IRMA) in Anand, 
founded in 1979, was set up to provide professional management and research support to cooperatives 
(Terhal, 1983). 
With an organizational structure in place, Operation Flood—a federally sponsored, national 
intervention that lasted from1970 to 1996—was to ensure that dairy products reached both rural and 
urban consumers in an efficient and effective manner while also off-setting seasonal fluctuations in the 
supply and price of milk.  The scale of Operation Flood and the dairy cooperative movement it 
engendered is fairly unique: millions of rural farmers and millions of urban dwellers simultaneously 
benefited from this agricultural intervention in dairying. According to Banerjee (1994), by the time the 
program ended in 1996, approximately 70,000   dairy cooperatives in 170 milk sheds encompassing 8.4 
million milk-producer families operated under Operation Flood. Other scholars have commented more 
recently that Operation Flood currently has 77,000 village dairy cooperative societies with more than 10 
million farmer members— and each cooperative is affiliated with 1 of 170 district and regional 
cooperative unions. A state cooperative marketing federation oversees the sub-state levels, and overall the 
industry produces enough to almost entirely eliminate India’s importing of dairy products (Perumal et al. 
2007).   
The scaling up of production, marketing, and processing was strategically synchronized in three 
distinct phases over a period of 25 years: Operation Flood I (OF I), Operation Flood II (OF II), and 
Operation Flood III (OF III). Each phase of the intervention was adapted to what had already been done: 
Operation Flood became a large-scale program gradually as each phase of the project built upon the 
achievements of the previous phase. Some implementation delays did affect each phase. For instance, OF 5 
I was achieved in double the time that was originally anticipated. Lags in aid delivery, the global dairy 
crisis, difficulties with absorbing commodities locally, and internal program difficulties all contributed to 
the delays (Doornbos et al. 1990).   
OF I, which was carried out from 1970 to 1981, essentially focused on market policy and 
initially, only targeted the four major Indian metropolitan cities of Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, and 
Chennai— at the time known as Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras—for milk distribution.  During OF 
I, only 1 million rural milk producers with 1.8 million milch animals were incorporated into the scheme. 
OF II lasted, from 1981 to 1985, during which time 10 million rural producers with several million heads 
of improved animal stock adopted the program. During this second phase, the number of milk sheds also 
increased from 18 to 27, and urban milk centers grew to cover all 147 major Indian cities. OF III, 
operational through 1996, consolidated and filled in the remaining gaps. The effort targeted nearly 7 
million farmer families and 170 milksheds, and improved overall veterinary healthcare (Atkins 1988, 
Chothani 1989). All three stages of the intervention were backed financially in v arious ways including 
international loans, donations of commodity aid, the Government of India, and internal program resources 
as well as finances generated from the intervention. The geographical spread of Operation Flood 
throughout the various stages demonstrates how large this initiative was and how it was scaled up 
gradually (Figure 1.2). More farmers became members of the cooperative and more village cooperatives 
existed as Operation Flood expanded (Table 1.1)  
   6 
Figure 1.2. Operation Flood’s geographical coverage 
Notes: The division of Operation Flood years into three phases will follow this map for this entire report. Publications vary in 
how the OF phases are divided and slightly different time periods (with Operation Flood II ending in 78, for example) are used. 
To be consistent, the time periods reported by the NDDB to the author are used in all text, tables, and graphs. 
Source: National Dairy Development Board 7 
Table 1.1. Cooperative growth during and after Operation Flood, 1970-2006  
Year  Farmer members 
(millions) 
Village milk cooperatives  
(Thousands) 
1970/71  0.3  1.6 
1975/76  0.6  4.5 
1980/81  1.8  13.3 
1985/86  4.5  42.7 
1990/91  7.5  63.4 
1995/96  9  69.6 
2000/01  10.7  96.2 
2003/04  12  108.6 
2004/05  12.3  113.2 
2005/06  12.4  117.6 
Sources: Gupta 1997; National Dairy Development Board 2005; Aneja 1994a. 8 
4.  OPERATION FLOOD: APPROACHES TO DAIRYING  
This section describes some of the factors that allowed Operation Flood to live up to its initial goal of 
ensuring long-term, self-reliance in milk while maximizing benefits for smallholder producers.  
Getting Organized  
Through Operation Flood, an organized, intricate dairy supply chain process replaced the ad hoc 
production marketing and selling of milk. One way of thinking about Operation Flood’s organizational 
structure is to envision a pyramid with three levels (Figure 1.3). At the base level were the village-level 
cooperatives responsible for all of the micro-inputs, including the production and testing of milk that was 
not only to be brought into the production-marketing chain but also be sold. Local farmers along with an 
elected management committee controlled these primary societies; over time they were required to 
include at least one female manager.   
The middle level, comprised of district-level cooperative unions, consisted of macro-inputs, such 
as the transportation of milk collection and processing equipment. These unions owned and operated the 
dairy processing plants, managed the cattle feed plants, and provided animal healthcare at the village 
level.  State-level marketing federations formed the third level of the pyramid and these bodies were used 
for marketing as well as coordinating logistics for interstate sales (Aneja 1994a). In addition to the three-
tiered structure, the NDDB operated externally as a facilitator— providing guidance and support for 
setting up the cooperative structure, funding it, and providing technical assistance.   
While an evaluation of the three-tiered structure indicates some inefficiencies and diseconomies, 
which suggest that there may have been an even better approach, this structure created a clear chain for 
getting milk from the small peasant cattle owner to the ordinary urban consumer, ensured seasonal 
continuity and fluidity from production to consumption. Also, the organizational structure allowed for 
simplicity and focus: for example, village-level cooperatives could not become overly ambitious and 
invest in high capital endeavors, which might have been beyond their own management capabilities.  
Figure 1.3. Pyramid structure of Operation Flood scheme  
 
 
Source: Devised by author.  
In short, this entire organizational structure allowed for a smooth transition to a cooperative way 
of dairying. The cooperatives, voluntary groupings of individual economic entities that are rooted in 
equality and democratic practices aiming to fulfill economic objective(s), in turn ensured that dairy 
development was directly responsive to the evolving needs of smallholder farmers (Narayanaswamy 
1996). Dairy cooperatives enable those who dominate India’s agriculture and livestock sectors— small 9 
producers—to contribute to sustainable growth of India’s economy, specifically to increase dairy 
productivity, increase their market participation, and earn fair profits on their investments (Patel 2004). 
Dairying through the cooperative system created natural channels to disseminate information, promote 
community wide knowledge and information sharing, and efficiently distribute technologies for dairy 
production and processing (Munshi and Parikh 1994). In fact, a national milk grid provided the physical 
infrastructure and organizational direction linking the surplus milk in one region to the demand for milk 
in another region (Figure 1.4).  
Figure 1.4. National milk grid   
 
Source: Atkins 1993.   
Operation Flood attempted to simultaneously address various types of barriers that smallholder 
producers could face: a lack of assets and technical skills, socio-cultural differences, and transaction 
costs. While cooperatives were the mechanism through which to address these obstacles in smallholder 
dairying, Operation Flood efforts did not always succeed. Sometimes dairy development occurred even 
faster in places where cooperatives were weak or didn’t exist. Some challenges for cooperatives included 
weak management, overstaffing, poor market orientation, and a lack of flexibility to respond to changes in 
market conditions (World Bank 1996). All cooperatives are not the same and hence the success rates have 
varied: success at the village or federal level often has been based on how effectively the cooperative 
serves the main needs of its members and usually to be effective in this endeavor requires appropriate 
design of the cooperative (Shah 1995).   10 
Using Aid for Development  
The way in which Operation Flood used donated dairy products was unique: it was the first time food aid 
was viewed as a critical investment resource (Banerjee 1994). During Operation Flood, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) donated surplus dairy commodities to India and the World Bank, as well as 
some bilateral donors, provided soft loans and grants as financial support for this intervention.   
To fund OF I, the idea was that the EEC would use the World FoodProgram as a conduit through 
which to donate surplus skimmed milk powder and butter oil; the total investment for this phase was 
estimated at Rs1200 million (Doornbos and Nair 1987). Ultimately, donated commodity aid for this 
period (1970-1981) was valued in the end at approximately Rs 1160 million and estimated to have 
generated over Rs1000 million (Terhal 1983; Chothani 1989; Aneja 1994).  
The original outlay cost of OF II was over Rs 4800 million of which nearly 50 percent would be 
received as dairy commodities (Doornbos and Nair 1987). This phase was also to be funded with EEC 
commodity aid, but this time the donation would be direct to India instead of through an international 
organization. During OF II, the value of donated skimmed milk powder and butter oil totaled Rs2452 
million. At this point, the World Bank (WB) came into the picture and began financing Operation Flood 
through a WB International Development Assistance soft loan of about US$150 million or the equivalent 
of about Rs1730 million (Chothani 1989; Sahni 1993; Terhal 1983).   
Finally, Operation Flood III was also meant to be partially funded by the World Bank and 
partially by EEC donations; including the NDDB’s use of its own resources of about Rs2077 million, the 
original additional outlay for this phase was estimated at Rs 6806 million (Gupta 1997; Doornbos and 
Nair 1987). This time the World Bank provided India with a credit loan valued around Rs360 million and 
the commodity aid provided by the EEC was valued at over Rs2200 million (Chothani 1989; Gupta 
1997).   
Some attempts have been made to sum up the total project costs. According to Gupta (1997), the 
total investment in Operation Flood exceeded Rs1600 million starting in 1970. The total inv estment of 
Rs16 billion or US $1 billion dollars, estimated at the time of the intervention, was divided into three 
large categories: 50 percent loans which India has been repaying since Operation Flood, 40 percent 
commodity aid from the EEC, and 10 percent investment of the NDDB’s own resources (Tikku 2003) 
The World Bank’s ex-post facto evaluation of Operation Flood reported a higher total project cost: 
US$2.7 billion, at 1996 dollar value. This figure includes the state milk plants that were transferred or 
leased to the initiative. Using data from the NDDB, World Bank, and the Government of India, this report 
summarizes that in 1996 dollar, nearly 2 billion dollars was provided in real direct subsidies and nearly .7 
billion in bank loans and credits (Candler and Kumar 1998).   
In addition to the donated commodity aid and the soft loans and grants provided by multilateral 
institutions, bilateral financial and technical assistance from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom was provided during the early years of Operation Flood (Doornbos et 
al. 1990). However, correspondence with the NDDB indicates that this type of assistance was not 
substantial and exact values are not documented. It is also important to note that member equity and 
profits generated by cooperative business were also a large part of Operation Flood’s financing The 
Indian people established creditworthy businesses and these cooperatives helped India achieve milk self-
sufficiency.  
The commodity aid (Table 1.2) and the financial donations were used to support the beginning 
stages of India’s dairy industry development and were gradually phased out. Indian leaders sought to use 
EEC dairy surpluses to meet India’s demand for milk which could not be met through domestic 
production alone, but to also concurrently use the aid to modernize India’s dairy industry Specifically 
cooperative and farmer owned processing plants which would combine surplus skimmed milk powder 
and butter oil they had received as commodity aid with milk that had been produced by Indian farmers, 
procured by local dairy cooperatives, and was sold to urban consumers at the then prevailing market 
price. They would then sell this new recombined milk to help meet domestic demand for milk and to help 
finance Operation Flood.   11 
Table 1.2. European Economic Community aid for Operation Flood, 1970-1996 




Operation Flood I (July 1970-March 1981)   126,000  42,000 
Operation Flood II (April 1981March 1985)   240,000  84,700 
Operation Flood III (April 1985-March 1996)   75,000  25,000 
Sources: Gupta 1997; Kaye 1994; Atkins 1988.  
Fortunately, Indian leaders had the foresight to consider the potential dangers to domestic markets 
if all the excess European milk were simply dumped into India’s dairy market instead of allowing this 
inefficiency to happen, they recognized the potential of modernizing the industry with the surpluses.  As 
such, Operation Flood stressed reliance on local production, procurement, marketing, and selling, and 
used the commodities and proceeds to promote overall dairy development instead of dependence.  The 
Indian government used the European surplus to create needed dairy supply and this helped to eliminate 
existing gaps in supply and demand. Once production and processing attained a certain scale there was an 
impetus to produce more milk for supply to the processing plants.  Imported commodity aid was then 
phased out.   
However, some scholars criticized the use of food aid for development: they argue that 
subsidizing Operation Flood through donations of Europe’s surplus dairy products provided a 
disincentive for local producers to produce.  According to Doornbos and Gertsch (1994), aid also skewed 
the market: by not allowing for a natural evolution of market forces, the aid usually ended up in favored 
regions or with larger producers. Yet Operation Flood demonstrated that aid is not synonymous with 
charity, but rather it can be channeled in such a way as to strengthen indigenous efforts, including small-
scale producers. For instance, more than 70 percent of households in Operation Flood regions were 
marginal, landless farmers.  In this context, food aid ensured that products offered for free or at extremely 
low prices would not over-flood the market and squeeze out local dairy farmers.  The commodity 
financing of India’s dairy development played a role in relieving the European countries of their excess 
dairy, but also in protecting India’s dairy market   
Given that Indian dairy production has continued to grow autonomously in post-Operation Flood, 
the dangers of dependency seem to have been avoided. In fact, as of 1976, India completely stopped 
commercial imports of milk and milk products— other than from 1987-1989, when prolonged droughts 
wrecked havoc on agriculture overall (Shah 1993). Ultimately, if the goal of aiding a nation is to end that 
nation’s future aid needs building its economies truly is a mechanism for reaching that goal (Banerjee 
1994).   
On the economic front, the use of food aid as a development investment was an anti-inflationary 
decision because it helped to ensure market stabilization and to limit fluctuations in prices since there was 
a constant buffer stock (Banerjee 1994). Several additional sound economic principles also helped to 
engender success. For instance, milk was recognized as a marketable commodity due to long-standing 
market demand and markets were established in urban areas to give confidence to the suppliers—dairy 
farmers—  to increase their investment. Several examples illustrate this success India’s larger economic 
reforms in 1991 and the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization 
agreements allowed India to exploit its comparative advantage in milk production relative to production 
costs in the United States and the European Union–provided that Indian farmers and processing units met 
international hygiene standards (Scholten 1998).  12 
Using Political Support Strategically  
Economic leadership, policies, and environments are crucial, but the political ones were also important in 
ensuring smooth implementation of Operation Flood. Indian leaders were not only the impetus for a 
successful intervention, but also a link to the many institutions and policies that helped Operation Flood 
to succeed. Government policies supportive of dairy cooperatives enabled the industry to develop in sync 
with the evolving needs of dairy farmers. Prime Minister Shastri’s leadership in setting-up a National 
Dairy Development Board, appointing Dr. Kurien - with the experience he had in setting up the AMUL 
cooperatives - to replicate the model nationally, and his social entrepreneurship in the overall design of 
Operation Flood were prerequisites to the many achievements.   
The NDDB’s autonomy allowed it to place producers at the forefront of decisions and create 
supporting entities to meet the needs of the growing cooperative movement. Overall, state interference 
and assistance with this project was minimal and Operation Flood exemplified the benefits of having 
dedicated professionals working on behalf of rural populations. Having an autonomous, dedicated body 
supporting dairy development was crucial, because the NDDB was able to create supporting entities to 
provide people, technology, veterinary services, equipment, and marketing that the cooperatives needed at 
an affordable price. Some of the wholly owned direct subsidiary organizations include the Indian Dairy 
Machinery Company, Ltd., Indian Immunologicals, and Mother Dairy (Tikku 2003).  
Some scholars, such as scientist Claude Alvares (1985), have criticized the minimal state 
intervention aspect of the program and argue that such immunity from government scrutiny enabled 
corruption, conflicts of interest, and duplicitousness to infiltrate. For example, political interference by 
some local politicians was a barrier to successful replication; in essence, sometimes government 
cooperatives were supported at the expense of farmer-managed cooperatives.  Despite having a well-
thought-out plan and a strong programmatic design, Operation Flood faced several hiccups during the 
implementation of the program. Institutional integration issues, overlaps and gaps in program coverage, 
and competing jurisdictions sometimes meant that ultimately the cooperative scheme that was adopted 
was not exactly the same as the original Anand plan (Doornbos and Gertsch 1994). In some cooperatives, 
state control over input and output pricing existed and some state officials were appointed to management 
positions. This diversion from farmer-control     cooperatives contributed to the poorer performance of led 
some cooperatives. Because the program spread vastly and quickly, to meet demand for the model, teams 
were created to administer and manage the establishment of state federations and district unions. In some 
instances, officials continued to hold onto this power even after Operation Flood instead of turning the 
cooperatives over to the farmers for bottom-up development. Even in these instances, while dairy plants 
and milk routes were developed, true development was limited a capacity building of non-elites was not 
prioritized (Kurien 1996).       
While Operation Flood was federally sponsored and managed by semi-state institutions, it was 
not a government-run initiative: ownership and management of day-to-day activities and resources 
happened locally. This minimized political interference, turf battles, and administrative red tape. Four 
consecutive prime ministers supported the large-scale dairy intervention (Kaye 1988), which speaks to the 
durability of the cooperative movement. Another political dynamic worth noting is that the NDDB was 
not headquartered in New Delhi, but was located in Anand so as to help prevent the organization from 
turning into an ivory tower institution (Kurien 1996). The WFP’s Terminal Evaluation Report notes the 
lack of political interference in the Operation Flood model, and further includes as the program’s assets 
its quality control standards, reliable technical assistance and the multi-level structure of representative 
democracy within dairy marketing and processing facilities. One main lesson to be learned is that 
nonpolitical interventions can be successful and can enjoy the backing of executives long past their initial 
implementation.   
Focusing on Local Methods and Markets  
Aside from having adequate technology for producing, procuring, processing, and marketing milk, an 
appropriate approach— namely, taking the local context into account— was another prerequisite to 13 
success. Operation Flood used existing, indigenous dairy farming techniques and was not a large 
imposition of foreign ideas, processes, and tools. Rather, this intervention employed ways in which to 
enhance local dairying or to spread the benefits to a larger number of people: it was a mechanism for 
production by the masses but not a switch to mass production (Patel 2007). Operation Flood promoted 
low-capital and low-energy intensive dairy production—labor-intensive production was important as 
smallholder farmers rely primarily on family and local labor. The Indian approach to dairying—using 
crop residues and by-products for milk production— was emphasized.  
When considering dairy in India, one should know that the Indian population places an intrinsic 
value on milk and milk products and that milch animals have played a role in Indian tradition throughout 
history. Implementation of improved dairying methods required a true understanding of how to process 
milk so that it was suitable for and accepted by Indian farmers and consumers. Those designing Operation 
Flood had to be cognizant of what new approaches dairy farmers would adopt and what type of milk and 
milk products consumers would purchase. Dairy development, including animal husbandry practices, can 
become a reality only if the population buys into the methods.  
Focusing on the local Indian market demands, Operation Flood advanced the industrial 
processing of traditional products through the cooperatives. Presently, around 95 percent of dairy is 
produced in India (Kurien 2004). An indigenous dairy equipment manufacturing industry has also been 
created and as of the late-1990s, less than 10 percent of India dairy equipment was being imported. There 
have been several other positive by product impacts of Operation Flood:  a remarkable accumulation of 
indigenous expertise on topics of animal nutrition, animal health, artificial insemination, management 
information systems, dairy engineering, and food technology (Candler and Kumar 1998).   
Another critical approach that was emphasized throughout the intervention was the local 
ownership of resources. Unlike most agricultural development interventions, local producers owned and 
controlled all of the resources. This allowed the rural population to use their initiative, insights, and 
energy to gain better prices as producers. As such, the roles of middle actors were eliminated and their cut 
of the profit stayed with the producers, allowing cooperatives to generate enough revenue to upgrade 
production (Kaye 1988). Historically, both the private and public sector have not proven to be equipped, 
trained, and incentivized to work with the poor; therefore, cooperative institutions for dairy seemed to be 
a way forward for the poor.  Through these means, the poor circumvented bureaucratic hurdles and 
instead acted collaboratively to reap the benefits of modern science and technology (Kurien 1996). 
Operation Flood’s successful balancing of external support—such as that of the NDDB— for a locally 
managed program prevented tyranny by the middle players and benefited millions of farmers.  
 14 
5.  OPERATION FLOOD: IMPACTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS   
Twelve years after the end of Operation Flood, it is worth taking a moment to re-examine this large-scale 
intervention and determine its achievements. While the cooperative share of national production is less 
than 10 percent, it does account for around 70 percent of the organized market share. Operation Flood’s 
total share of cooperatives is but a small percentage of overall milk procured and marketed in India and, 
therefore, the intervention’s overall impacts should not be overstated although overall growth in India’s 
dairy sector may have occurred regardless and other factors may have played an even larger role in the 
development of India’s dairy sector, Operation Flood created a new policy environment in the dairy sector 
and linked rural and urban populations, introduced market orientation and technological advancements, 
developed extension services, and supported the growth of cooperatives in a sustainable manner.          
Rural/Urban Linkages  
Through a system of cooperatives, this intervention established some important urban-rural linkages, such 
as those in key markets of Bombay and Delhi. This linkage of rural farmers and urban consumers may not 
have been accomplished by an informal dairy sector. It’s important to consider that the primary goal of 
Operation Flood was to increase the production of milk and to increase the income generated from 
dairying for millions of producers. Therefore, increasing one’s purchasing power was a prerequisite to 
addressing food insecurity at the individual and household level, since malnutrition—except for in 
emergency situations—is often due to a lack of income, not always a lack of food availability (Jul 1988). 
With Operation Flood, as the number of investments in the program increased so did the number of 
producers, convinced as they were of the stable and profitable nature of dairy sales.  
In other words, rural milk producers were gradually ensured a market through which to sell their 
milk and thus their confidence in the ability of dairying to serve as a source of employment and an income-
generating activity increased. This idea was at the center of the Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers’ 
Union the foundation for Operation Flood’s design.   
If markets could pull production then these markets needed to be protected and guaranteed. 
Donated and subsidized imports were a noted threat to Indian dairying and the livelihoods of tens of 
millions of producers. For the Indian economy, it was important for the government to protect the Indian 
markets. Therefore, during Operation Flood, the government placed quantitative restrictions on dairy 
imports and used licensing requirements restricting new entrants as a means of regulating the private sector 
and. protecting cooperatives (Staal, Pratt, and Jabbar 2008b).      
In India, agriculture is the main means of livelihood and income for millions of farmers, with crop 
production and dairying the primary and secondary activities respectively. In rural areas, Operation Flood 
was India’s largest sustainable employment program—and it developed transportation routes and urban 
employment in dairy plants as well. A study of three districts—Bikaner in Rajasthan, Periyar in Tamil 
Nadu, and Sabarkantha in Gujarat—indicated that in cooperative villages, the average household income 
from all income sources are higher, the average income from milk is generally larger, and the average level 
of employment is higher (Singh and Das 1984).   
Smallholder dairy farmers brought in more than 60 percent of milk procured by cooperatives and 
these producers in turn were paid approximately Rs 34,000 million (Aneja and Puri 1997). For poorer 
farmers, dairy may be more significant. Atkins (1989), for example, argues that Operation Flood had been 
India’s most promising large-scale, wealth-generating rural development program. Achaya and Huria 
(1986a) assert that poverty levels have declined and that drops in rural poverty were more pronounced than 
in urban poverty—Operation Flood, they say, is one of the critical reasons that poverty in India lowered 
from 49 percent to 38 percent. Jul (1988) points out that increased productivity in the dairy industry had 
also enhanced economic development. Specifically, the development of a national milk grid, village 
cooperatives and district unions increased employment throughout India. Staff was hired to run the 
thousands of dairy cooperative societies that had emerged and provide animal husbandry services, 
including veterinary care and artificial insemination. As of the early twenty-first century, dairy 15 
cooperatives employed 11 million households; Indian households benefited from cooperatives they owned, 
cooperatives that sold animal feed to them, veterinary coverage for dairy animals, and cooperatives which 
purchased their milk, for example (Kurien 2004).    
Dairying Breakthroughs  
Breakthroughs in the methods for improving the production, processing, procurement and marketing of 
dairy were substantial. For example, technological advances in drying, storage, and transportation 
partially alleviated fluctuations in production levels between the lean and flush seasons. Table 1.3 
provides detailed information about the overall increases in India’s production levels and per capita 
availability of milk between 1950 and 2008. It is important to stress that even at the end of Operation 
Flood, the cooperative share of dairying still accounted for only about 6-7 percent of India’s overall milk 
production. Not much has changed over the years and the informal sector continues to share more than 80 
percent of the total market for milk and milk products (Staal, Pratt, and Jabbar 2008b). However, milch 
animals’ productivity tripled between 1970 and the early-1990s, and total milk production in Operation 
Flood areas increased from 42 million liters per day to 67 million liters per day between 1988-89 and 
1995-96 (Shukla and Brahmankar 1999, Aneja 1994a).   
Regarding production capacity, about 726 tons of milk powder could be produced per day 
(Banerjee 1994). Some counter that production in India hasn’t had a major breakthrough seasonality of 
milk production still creates irregular supplies, and that Operation Flood perpetuated traditional regional 
differences in Indian dairying. If this were true, Operation Flood could not be defended as an intervention 
which addressed the internal limitations of the dairy sector in India.  However, using an econometric 
approach (1987), Mergos and Slade determined the influence of Operation Flood on milk production in a 
group of villages in Madhya Pradesh and unambiguously rejected the hypothesis that the intervention did 
not result in an increase in milk production.  Their studies revealed that the project can be credited with 
increasing milk output in those areas by 17.4 percent in a five-year period. In sum, exposing a particular 
household to the project increased the probability of that household’s milk output would rise 
substantially. Furthermore, in the eyes of many beneficiaries, the fact that Operation Flood also created 
opportunities for the expansion of marketing and processing services justified its continuous aid 
worthiness (Baviskar and Terhal 1990, 341).  
This study is available as a World Bank discussion paper and used a cross-sectional comparison 
using project and control samples. The authors did not use baseline data on dairy activities of the sampled 
farmers. Therefore, the potential for selection biases does exist within this study. Other studies referenced 
in this paper may be stronger given their larger data sets and more rounds of surveying.  
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Table 1.3. Production and per capita availability of milk in India, 1950-2008 
Years  Production 
(Million Tons) 
Per Capita Availability 
(Grams/Day) 
1950  17  132 
1960  20  127 
1968  21  113 
1973  23  111 
1980  32  128 
1990-91  54  182 
1995-96  66  207 
2000-01  81  230 
2005-06  97  241 
2006-07  101  246 
2007-08  105  252 
Source: Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, NDDB website, 
accessed 9/15/09; Gupta 1997; Nair 1985.  
Milk processing also advanced during Operation Flood. As the sheer amount of processed goods 
increased, so did the amount of equipment, such as silos, pasteurizers, rail and road storage tanks, and 
refrigerators that conformed to international standards. Milk testers were designed to weigh, test, and 
record milk production levels. The capacity for processing milk reached about 15.6 million liters per day 
whereas the capacity for chilling milk reached 6.5 million liters per day (Banerjee 1994). Processing 
increases were not always uniform, however. For example, in December 1980, raw milk processing in 
four OF I dairies based in Gujarat was at full capacity (1.6 million liters/day), but it was below capacity in 
other OF facilities (Terhal 1983). Throughout Operation Flood, the NDDB devised new storage methods 
were devised and milk was converted from a highly perishable commodity into one that can be stored and 
traded nationwide. As reported by Kurien (1996), the NDDB developed and owned a fleet of rail milk 
tankers which they hired out to cooperatives; this was to ensure transportation of milk from areas of 
excess to those in deficit, diminishing seasonal production and consumption disparities. To link village 
producers and city-based consumers, a network was established that included trucks, chilling plants, 
refrigerated vans, railway wagons, and processing plants. 
As for milk procurement, a comparison of the years 1988-89 and 1995-96, shows an increase in 
milk procurement in Operation Flood areas from 28 million liters per day to 35 million liters per day 
(Shukla and Brahmankar 1999).   Baviskar and Terhal (1990) have rightfully stated, however, that milk 
procurement increases among dairy cooperatives don’t indicate that milk-animal productivity or even 
overall milk productivity has increased. They further note that any overall increases in milk production 
that did occur were not necessarily attributable to Operation Flood.  Toward the end of Operation Flood, 
average milk procurement was at about 12.3 million kg per day with 8.2 of the 12.3 marketed as liquid 
milk, and the rest turned into milk powder, butter, and cheese.   
Interestingly, it is neither the national milk grid nor the transportation advances alone that have 
changed the way milk is being marketed in India—even the packaging had been transformed. Most of the 
milk is now packaged in plastic sachets and the machines that make the small sachets are produced 
indigenously.  Also, a major innovation by the NDDB was the development of in the bulk vending of 
milk—an indigenous system using gravity milk feeding and a syphon technique to provide consistent 
quantities of milk. Retail sales resulting from the Operation Flood cooperatives increased throughout its 
various phases. As of 1970, about only 1 million liters per day were sold, but as OF II was picking up, 
sales increased to about 5 million liters per day and were nearly 10 million liters per day toward the end 
of the twentieth century (Candler and Kumar 1998). In urban areas alone, the amount of milk marketed by 
cooperatives increased more than 50 times between 1970-71 and 1990-91 (Fulton and Bhargava 1994). At 17 
the end of Operation Flood, the dairy cooperatives were meeting 60 percent of urban milk demand and 
were 22 percent of all milk marketed in India overall (Candler and Kumar 1998). Table 1.4 provides 
summary data for procurement and marketing advances throughout Operation Flood.  
Table 1.4. Peak procurement and peak marketing of Operation Flood dairying 
Phase of Intervention  Peak Procurement (liters per day)  Peak Marketing (liters per day) 
Operation Flood I  
(1970-81)  
3.4 million  2.8 million 
Operation Flood II  
(1981-85)  
7.9 million  5.0 million 
Operation Flood III  
(1985-96)  
1.3 million  9.4 million 
Source: Dairy India 1997.  
In isolation, these technological breakthroughs would have been largely irrelevant, but since a 
year-round market also supported the producers, the technology was put into practice and Operation 
Flood—through direct and indirect pathways— positively affected food security in India. To its critics, 
however, the centralization of dairy has led to homogenization and hence failed to take into account the 
unique needs, challenges, and opportunities found throughout India (George 1990). Again, only a small 
proportion of the dairy market is dominated by cooperatives, and little evidence indicates that 
cooperatives have driven India’s dairy growth ; however, according to one study,  data suggests that dairy 
co-operatives have impacted the supply of milk because they have promoted the introduction of new 
technology and in particular, enhanced dairy cattle (Staal, Pratt and Jabbar 2008b) India’s growth in 
dairying in absolute numbers is quite remarkable but what stands out even more is that India’s population 
was growing at the same time; taking this context into account truly magnifies how drastic the increases 
in per capita availability are. Based on all the evidence and expert opinions, it can be surmised that this 
large-scale ambitious and innovative development program remains controversial among the scholars. Yet 
while it is true that all of the increases in the production, procurement, processing and marketing of milk 
cannot be attributed to Operation Flood, this intervention was instrumental in setting up a new approach 
to dairying in India. Unfortunately, a review of the literature reveals a dearth of microstudies on the 
subject as well as a serious lack of independent data collection and impact evaluation. Further data 
collection and analysis on both microlevel and macrolevel impacts would help to clarify Operation 
Flood’s impacts on poverty and food security.  
Improved Nutritional Intake  
With increased incomes from dairy sales, smallholder dairy farmers could spend more on nutritious foods. 
Overall growth in Indians’ daily consumption of milk before Operation Flood and throughout the 
intervention is presented in Table 1.5. Average per capita consumption of dairy rose from about 132 
grams per day in 1951 to around 200 grams by the end of Operation Flood (Aneja 1994a, Bhide and 
Chaudhari 1997). Total per capita consumption of milk by dairy farmers increased in Operation Flood 
areas from 290 grams per day in 1988-89 to 339 grams day in 1995-96 at the aggregate level (Shukla and 
Brahmankar 1999). Village-level studies have revealed that consumption of milk and other food stuffs 
was substantially higher in rural Operation Flood areas compared to rural non-Operation Flood areas, an 
indication that this program improved the dietary diversity and nutritional status of its participants.   
Importantly, milk is a primary source of animal protein for Indians; hence, if production increases 
reach a larger number of people in a more consistent manner, it stands to reason that their protein levels 
will improve. According to Mergos and Slade’s studies (1987), food expenditure was positively 
correlated with Operation Flood’s introduction into certain areas of India, and at least in the area studied, 18 
it had a positive impact on the caloric and protein levels of the rural population chaya and Huria’s 
analysis (1986, a) of Operation Flood noted dietary improvements in higher levels of vitamin A and C 
intake, in addition to caloric and protein intake. In addition, according to Singh and Das’ microlevel 
studies in the three districts of Bikaner, Periyar, and Sabarkantha and in all cooperative villages, 
nutritionally vulnerable populations received a higher percentage share of milk than the percentage share 
in the total village populations. Furthermore, looking at vulnerable subcategories, per capita protein intake 
and higher consumption levels were seen in expectant and nursing mothers as well as children two to six 
years old (Singh and Das 1984). Of the milk produced in the OF areas, about 65 percent was traded, and 
35 percent was consumed by the producing household (Bhide and Chaudhari 1997). This is significant 
because a poor persons’ nutritional status can be dramatically improved by consuming even marginal 
amounts of milk; dairy consumption is vital, especially for children and mothers who are nursing or 
expectant. Additionally, in most developing countries, soil fertility is a major agricultural limitation, but 
manure from dairy cows provides organic matter and nutrients. This can augment a smallholder’s crop 
yields for farmers with limited access to chemical fertilizer (Staal, Pratt, and Jabbar 2008b).   
Table 1.5. Growth of daily consumption of milk in India, 1951-1996 
Years  Daily Consumption  
(Avg Grams/Day) 
1950-1951  124 
1960-1961  124 
1973-1974  112 
1981-1982  136 
1991-1992  178 
1995-1996  197 
Source: Government of India. Department of Animal Husbandry Development and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, various 
sources. 
Development of Extension Services The development of extension services and their 
accompanying advances in technology were broad and important. One goal of these services was to 
improve overall cattle health and nutrition, thus ensuring more productive dairy cattle, and as such 
Operation Flood brought about new standards for livestock. Some of the ways in which Operation Flood 
promoted technological advances included artificial inseminations, crossbreeding, vaccinations, 
improvements in cattle feeds, urea treatment of straw (to improve digestibility of straw), and the use of 
fans and sprinklers to cool cows in the summer and biogas plants for production and processing (Candler 
and Kumar 1998). 
As market competition expanded, the producer price of milk shifted upwards, resulting in an 
increased use of concentrate feed and a higher demand for superior animal husbandry, such as veterinary 
services and artificial insemination (Mergos and Slade 1987).   Artificial insemination, a big change for 
rural producers, grew throughout India as a result of Operation Flood: about 18 million artificial 
inseminations were performed annually at the village-level by paraprofessionals, who were supported by 
trained professionals running semen banks and stud stations (Kurien 1996). Through Operation Flood, an 
additional 16,280 dairy cooperative societies were involved in artificial insemination (Gupta 1997). 
Although the number of artificial inseminations increased, member households using this service only 
marginally increased between 1988 and 1996—contributing factors to this small increase may have been 
an underdeveloped infrastructure and extension services (Shukla and Brahmankar 1999). According to the 
Government of India (2008), growth in artificial insemination continued after Operation Flood:  between 
1999-2000 and 2006-07, artificial inseminations increased from 20 million to 34 million (See Annex 1). 
Extension activities, such as education in cattle breeding, meetings for knowledge sharing and tours of 
dairy plants were and still remain an essential component of milk cooperatives. Important to note is that 19 
women play a vital role in caring for the milch animals and therefore these extension services 
significantly impact women’s knowledge confidence and societal status.  
Also, to increase milk production without increasing the overall cattle populations, it was 
important to increase the productivity of milch animals. Therefore, a notable, and also contentious, aspect 
of Operation Flood was to crossbreed exotic cows with indigenous cows and to improve the productivity 
of buffaloes. With crossbred cows, reproductive efficiency improved. During Operation Flood, 100 
indigenous cows provided only about 150 kg of milk a day, whereas 100 crossbred cows provided about 
400 kg per day (Guha 1980). While crossbreeding increased the breeding capacity and milk yield of cows, 
critics argue that higher feed requirements and an inability of these breeds to adapt to Indian conditions 
led to India’s slow adoption of it. For example, Atkins (1988) argues that although using domestic cattle 
would not have been as efficient as crossbred cattle, the crossbred animals suffered heat stress, were 
disease-prone, and required greater feed inputs. In addition, crossbreeding is thought to privilege larger 
farmers, eliminate indigenous Indian animals, and increase reliance on advanced feed. Mergos and Slade 
(1987) respond to critical opinions by showing that India was not overly dependent on crossbred cattle 
and new technologies. Achaya and Huria (1986a, 1986b) argue that the nearly doubling of milk 
production after Operation Flood’s inception should have put an end to the speculation of problems 
associated with adopting crossbreeding. The reality is that the theoretical objections are faulty: landless 
milk producers did acquire crossbred animals, only a small percentage of Operation Flood’s strategy was 
focused on crossbred animals and the Indian government also had a strategy for improving productivity 
through crossbreeding and cattle upgrading, without exterminating well-known Indian cattle breeds. 
Therefore, even if crossbreeding has problems, harsh criticisms are indeed exaggerative.  
Societal Development  
Operation Flood had significantly altered rural India in other positive ways, external to the dairy and food 
security realms. The intervention required an effective infrastructure and hence improved the existing one 
by setting up about 175 dairy plants, 45 cattle feed plants, about 15,000 centers for artificial insemination, 
100 rail milk tankers and more than 1,500 road milk tankers (Tikku 2003). Accessing major cities in India 
needed to be easier for those in the dairy industry so transportation systems, such as railways and roads, 
were improved. As a result of Operation Flood, an increase in demand for access between rural and urban 
areas occurred and as this need was demonstrated, roads were constructed (Candler and Kumar 1998). 
Furthermore, all population sectors participated in the intervention: for example, at the milk collection 
centers, men and women lined up together. In this way, Operation Flood helped to eliminate social 
barriers as both men and women milked their animals and marketed their milk at the cooperative twice 
daily. Community development was enhanced as gender differences and social class divisions were 
broken down (FAO 1978). Finally, discussions could be heard among beneficiaries as they shared ideas 
of sanitation and cleanliness, which was an increased desire by many.   Despite these broad social 
achievements, the impacts of Operation Flood were not felt equally by all: one’s gender caste class and 
landownership status played a role in how one was impacted by these changes in dairy farming. Growth 
in the smallholder livestock sector, according to Mellor (2003), has a direct positive contribution on 
poverty reduction, employment growth, and eventually, demand for employment in the rural nonfarm 
sectors “In sharp contrast to crop income the Gini coefficient for dairy production, which is very 
important to the poor in India because of its labor intensity, is 0.11. That is an extraordinarily low Gini 
coefficient. And, the Gini coefficient for off-farm work in rural areas is a still low 0.22” (Mellor 1999, 3). 
Therefore, investments in dairy over investments in crop production seem to promote income equality 
(Birthal, Taneja, and Thorpe 2006). Some scholars, such as Verhagen (1990), argue that poor and 
marginalized farmers (for example, the landless) were underrepresented and that barriers, such as a lack 
of access to credit and fodder, prevented many from accruing potential program benefits from Operation 
Flood. He argues that in the Kheda district, poverty and inequality continued to increase in the late 70s 
and early 80s despite the presence of the Anand cooperatives. However, even if this charge is true, it is 
also true that it was not Operation Flood’s primary aim to improve income distribution by reaching out to 20 
small, marginal farmers and landless milk producers. Nevertheless, by promoting universal access to a 
strong milk market, balanced cattle feed, animal healthcare, and artificial insemination service, it stands to 
reason that this intervention would have some positive impact on income distribution between the rich 
and the poor. Empirical evidence shows that Operation Flood did not merely help rich farmers get their 
milk to urban consumers, but it also directly engaged poor people. Atkins noted that in 1984, 72 percent 
of cooperative members were small and marginal farmers or operated less than 5 hectares of land, and the 
majority of these were also from minority castes and tribes Landless farmers’ incomes doubled after the 
organization of milk collection through cooperatives (FAO Information Division 1978). 
Thirunavukkarasu Prabaharan and Ramasamy’s later studies (1991) showed that among landless 
households milk production’s contribution to income generation was considerable and confirmed a 
greater potential for economically weaker households to use milk production to increase their income 
levels. Studies conducted by Singh and Das (1984) also indicate that the landless fare better in 
cooperative villages for milk yield per milch animal. The average profit in 1985-86 for a year’s supply of 
milk was Rs 1 845 with an additional Rs 400 in bonuses. Simply put, dairy farming can minimize poverty 
and even enhance incomes for poor households.   
Additionally, the impact of livestock-based programs—such as Operation Flood—on women can 
vary. On the one hand, livestock interventions can be an opportunity to generate income, but it also can 
increase workloads without truly altering women’s level of control over resources. Were the cooperatives 
established under Operation Flood truly beneficial to women’s health employment, and income? Given 
that poverty is gendered in myriad ways, did Operation Flood increase or decrease segregation? Why 
were women incorporated in larger numbers in the later stages of the intervention? In India women’s 
workloads tend to be quite intense as they handle housework and much of the agricultural chores, 
especially in dairying. Despite having double and triple work burdens, societal structures ensure that they 
maintain subordinate roles. But although gender disparities are clearly oppressive, it is overly simplistic 
to analyze in isolation the role that gender plays in Operation Flood.  
What is certain is that the way in which gender intersects with one’s class sexual orientation and 
race is a major determinant for how one’s life is lived. For example, in dairying, poorer women do not 
keep the milk within their households— it mainly goes to the males of the house; however, this scenario 
may or may not be true for women who are better off socioeconomically. Some critics of Operation Flood 
initially argued that increased demand to procure milk twice daily for the cooperative would force women 
to use agricultural resources for fodder crops instead of food crops—with the result that milk would 
become an inaccessible luxury for poor women. Another concern was the potential male opposition to the 
female cooperatives increasing in the countryside. At the end of the day, these scholars argue the case 
that, even if Operation Flood helps poor women farmers, broader gender disparities within the dairy 
industry, such as a division of labor and women stereotypes remain intact (Sharma and Vanjani 1993).   
Although some of these criticisms may be valid, and while it is true that Operation Flood cannot 
dismantle centuries-old patriarchal traditions and structures, data indicate that women did benefit from 
this intervention. Studies by Thirunavukkarasu, Prabaharan, and Ramasamy (1991) illustrate that 
employment rates, including those of female workers, were higher among Operation Flood beneficiaries 
than among non-beneficiaries. Overall employment in milk production was markedly higher in 
cooperative villages than in control villages and in the former, female family members contributed more. 
In fact, when comparing landless households and landowning households in six different villages, the 
share of female labor out of total labor for dairying was bigger in the landless households (Singh and Das 
1984). In other words, Operation Flood uniquely increased employment for landless female dairy farmers 
in relation to all female dairy farmers. Equally important, Terhal and Doornbos (1983) note that for 
women who were already engaged in dairy prior to Operation Flood, it is highly unlikely that their 
workload increased; however, for women that took up dairying because of Operation Flood, their 
workload has increased. On a related note, extension activities that were essential components of the milk 
cooperatives— such as education in cattle breeding, meetings for knowledge sharing and tours of dairy 
plants—have increasingly engaged women, improving their dairy know-how, self-assurance, and in turn, 
social status . Training sessions on a wide variety of dairying topics have increased women’s participation 21 
and built confidence in their participation in dairy development. Women are not only increasingly 
depositing milk in the cooperatives, but also seeing the benefits of higher prices, information sharing, and 
access to healthcare for livestock. Women now make up over 25 percent of cooperative members and 
more than 2,700 all-women cooperatives are functioning. However, women continue to play a small role 
in running the dairy cooperative societies: less than 3 percent of board members are women (Nehru 2005; 
NDDB 2008).   
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6.  OPERATION FLOOD: A SUSTAINABLE INTERVENTION  
The consistently large number of members, volumes of milk produced annually by cooperatives, and the 
increasing access to larger quantities and higher-quality milk products provide evidence of this 
intervention’s sustainability. Since the 1970s, total output of milk and milk products has continuously 
risen faster than crop production. Between 1970-71 and 1990-91, village milk producers’ cooperatives 
increased almost 40 times and the number of producers with cooperative membership increased almost 27 
times in the same time period (Fulton and Bhargava 1994). The NDDB, currently chaired by Amrita 
Patel, continues to expand India’s dairy development, and the program’s cooperative way of dairying 
gives millions of rural producers the opportunity to use dairying as a way out of poverty and hunger.   
The sustainability of dairy cooperatives is revealed: in more than a decade after Operation Flood 
ended, the dairy cooperative network continues to grow, as does production, marketing and innovation in 
the milk sector: presently more than 13 million Indian farmers, including 3.7 million women farmers, 
belong to India’s thousands of village-level dairy cooperatives (NDDB 2009). The dairy industry overall 
and cooperatives in particular, even after Operation Flood, has also been impressive. In fact, the average 
daily procurement of dairy has reached 21.5 million liters, and the annual production of dairy has reached 
more than 100 million tons. Furthermore, the daily per capita availability of milk is near 250 grams 
(Government of India 2008). Cooperative membership has continually grown between 1970 and 2008 
(Figure 1.5) and has been accompanied by overall growth in India’s milk production (Figure 1.6).  
Figure 1.5. Growth in India’s dairy cooperatives, 1970-2006 
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Figure 1.6. India’s milk production since Operation Flood, 1995-2008 
 
Source: Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, NDDB website, 
accessed 9/15/09. 
Operation Flood’s financial sustainability can be measured in various ways, including its rate of 
return, reliance on subsidies, and the durability of the business model. A cost-benefit analysis of dairying 
interventions reveals that this is a good sector of the economy not only for employment creation, but also 
for investment purposes. Investing one rupee into the dairy sector might spawn three rupees worth of 
employment (Shah 2000). Punjab Agricultural University completed a cost of milk production study in 
two milksheds and testified that in 1994-95, the average gross revenue was 9.30 Rs/liter, with a gross 
margin of 3.61 Rs/liter and a 33 percent net return (3.06 Rs/liter). The study included labor, capital, and 
land costs. The rate of return was high (45 percent) and the payback periods was low (25 years) (Candler 
and Kumar 1998).   
To what extent was Operation Flood dependent on the considerable amount of foreign aid and 
how did this affect the overall sustainability of the intervention? The funding of Operation Flood and the 
debates surrounding the use of food aid for development were already covered in this paper. But in the 
context of sustainability, the subsidies point must be brought up again, given the large role food aid plays 
in this program. After a thorough review of the literature, it appears that the total public sector cost could 
be determined by finding the sum of the value of donated commodities, international aid, and government 
investments. All of these costs are detailed in Table 1.2 and they are the most common cost references 
throughout published materials about Operation Flood. During Operation Flood, donated commodities 
were marketed to dairies at the then-prevailing market rates, and the funds generated were used to set up 
cooperatives and other parts of the program. Doornbos (1987) argued that the difference between the 
price rural milk producers were willing to accept as payment from the cooperatives and the price urban 
consumers were willing to pay were too small to cover the various expenses associated with the 
processing and marketing of milk Therefore without commodity aid India’s dairy industry would have 
been confronted with an unpleasant adjustment process. Atkins countered that between1982-83 and 1984-
85 India imported 1.2 million tons of whole milk representing 17.7 percent of Operation Flood’s total 


























all three stages, but the monetization of donated dairy commodities only partially financed this program. 
Member equity and reserves created with the income from member businesses with cooperatives also 
financially supported this intervention and ensured that the ultimate objective—self-sufficiency in milk 
production, not union and federation financial self-sufficiency—was obtained.    
Operation Flood is to be commended as an approach that applied solid market and economic 
principles, starting with basic supply and demand fundamentals.   The architects of the program 
continuously analyzed the rising demand for livestock in India, and devised a dairying program to supply 
dairy and dairy products to meet the new demand. In addition, the initial phase determined the economic 
viability of using dairy food aid to help jumpstart the reorganization of domestic dairying. Cooperatives 
were established with market incentives and infrastructural development, and economies of scale were 
emphasized in Operation Flood’s design. Lastly Operation Flood focused on ensuring efficiency in 
supply-chain management, quality control by cooperatives, and effective markets for both inputs and 
services.   
Environmental sustainability of dairy development, and specifically Operation Flood, should also 
be analyzed. Some of the questions that need to be answered focus on how land was used, how the 
intervention affects biodiversity, how climate change determines the life of the intervention, and what the 
other negative externalities are. Unfortunately, the environmental effects of Operation Flood have not 
been closely analyzed. However, one of the reasons that this intervention was brought about was in 
response to mid-twentieth century rapid urbanization in India. The lack of a reliable market for dairy was 
encouraging city dwellers to bring cattle into the city. This move not only created a nuisance, but also 
generated health hazards and environmental harms.  As the cattle population was increasing in 
metropolitan areas, it also required that feed and fodder be brought into the city, which added to overall 
production costs. Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that the rural production of milk may have helped 
to get the cattle out of major cities, which in turn improved the environments of urban dwellers. The 
extent to which this has actually happened is unclear since many of these animal owners were reportedly 
milk dealers without plans of becoming farmers. (Jul 1988).   
Another environmental benefit of traditional Indian dairy production (emphasized under 
Operation Flood) is that the cattle feed on crop residues and by-products and provide fertilizer to 
replenish the soil. Policies and strategies were implemented for all aspects of dairy development, 
including devoting resources to animals and their feed, health coverage, and breeding so as to reinforce 
the natural symbiotic relationship between humans and animals. Animal dung production provides 
organic manure, which helps to maintain soil fertility as well as provide fuel used by farm households for 
food preparation. Organic manure also helps in mitigating micronutrient deficiencies, which can be severe 
in areas of intensive irrigation and cultivation and in ensuring greater efficiency in inputs and savings 
from more costly and toxic chemical fertilizers (Patel 1993). Despite the fact that some worry about the 
trade-off in the production of crops at the expense of livestock-based food production, these two activities 
can be complementary: crops and crop residues provide feed for the animals while the animals provide 
manure and animal traction, which improves soil fertility (Steinfeld 2003). Operation Flood’s approach to 
supporting indigenous, rather than Western, dairying was sustainable.   
Critics of dairy development sometimes argue that dairying may adversely affect other 
agricultural developments, such as grain production, by changing the incentives for production or by 
reallocating land usage. However, claims about the negative ecological externalities from Operation 
Flood have been difficult to substantiate (Mergos and Slade 1987).  A comprehensive assessment of 
ecological damage from the technological mechanization of dairy processes and other aspects of 
Operation Flood has not been conducted. Given that milk production in India is based on crop residues, it 
is unlikely that a dairy initiative resulted in competition between animals and humans. 
Finally, reviewing how supportive the community and policymakers were of Operation Flood— 
whether or not it was a source of conflict in India, how non-beneficiary groups felt about the program, 
and how well the program adapted to constantly fluctuating external influences—will demonstrate its 
social and political sustainability. Given that this was a federally sponsored, but not federally dependent, 
intervention, it is interesting to note that this program had the backing of at least four different prime 25 
ministers.  Although local politics may have interfered with Operation Flood’s cooperatives in some 
cases, overall the government was not in control of the program, but rather major aspects of it were in the 
hands of the local producers. Most importantly, the program appears to have impacted millions of rural 
milk producers and urban consumers, and the cooperatives and innovations that took place throughout it 
also seemed to raise awareness about how powerful collective action can be.  Petty political differences 
were minimized and a spirit of cohesion was strengthened by the cooperatives’ organizational structure. If 
such a cohesive spirit is fostered and can overcome the caste and class hierarchies that are so deeply 
embedded in Indian society, then rural development should be greatly enhanced now and in the future 
(Singh and Das 1984). In the end, Operation Flood followed a sustainable approach as strong linkages 
were made within the communities among the villagers from the very beginning; human resource 
investments of this type are vital if development initiatives are to be successful.    
While the cooperative movement has steadily increased over the last several decades in India, its 
role in the dairy sector could diminish if certain challenges are not addressed. Cooperatives, protected for 
a long time, have faced challenges from the private sector since the economic liberalization of the early-
1990s. For example, licensing restrictions, which affects the competition faced by cooperatives, have 
fluctuated over time. Governmental interference in cooperatives, a lack of strong member equity, 
inefficiencies and diseconomies resulting from the three-tiered structure, and a lack of professionalism 
among cooperative managers all present challenges and opportunities for the continued growth of the 
dairy cooperative movement. While the program itself follows a sustainable model, the long-term 
sustainability of the cooperative way of dairying in India is unknown. Various political, social, 
environmental, and economical factors will determine the future of cooperatives and dairying more 
broadly. 
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7.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION FLOOD  
Operation Flood was a success: it met its end goal to establish the foundation for an enduring and durable 
cooperative dairy sector that in turn would ensure India’s long-term self-reliance in milk with maximum 
benefits to dairy producers. Operation Flood successfully set up a stable, remunerative market for 
producers, who continued to invest in expanded production and improved productivity to meet growing 
demands for dairy. Some of the underlying principles of Operation Flood are applicable to similar 
interventions in other settings or with other commodities in India. For example, the design and 
implementation, the positives and negatives of the approach, as well as the myriad ways in which it 
generated impact, must be analyzed if the program is to be replicated. Imitations have already been 
spawned.  In India alone, the Anand cooperative model is being replicated for other products, including 
oilseeds, trees, rural electricity, and fish (Shah 1996).   The model is also being followed in other Asian 
nations, such as Sri Lanka, China, and the Philippines (Ali and Bhargava 1998). World Bank President 
Robert Zoellick recently announced that the World Bank will try to apply some of these best practices in 
Africa: for example, applying the low-input and low-output Anand model in Tanzania and Uganda. 
Although the list is not exhaustive, the following are many of the imperative lessons to be learned from 
Operation Flood. 
Use Aid for Development  
Up until Operation Flood and even in the twenty-first century, food aid has been used primarily for 
humanitarian purposes. However, Operation Flood used donated commodities to produce dairy products 
for prime markets and to generate funding to finance the creation of a dairy cooperative infrastructure. 
This system provides hope that food aid can be used to generate increased levels of domestic production.  
In addition to this straight-forward lesson, a related and more subtle message is the importance of a longer 
-term perspective. The foresight of several leaders enabled them to see what could happen if new avenues 
for dairy development were not pursued: mass quantities of cheap dairy imports were avoided as they 
would have tanked the local markets in India. This strategy of using food aid as a development investment 
was also an anti-inflationary economic measure that helped to ensure market stabilization and limit 
fluctuations in prices.  
Invest in Local Markets  
Economic leadership, policies, and institutions created the enabling environment for Operation Flood’s 
successful implementation. From the outset, the intervention recognized that commodity production in the 
rural areas needs a strong marketing channel and the overall programmatic design therefore focused on 
both aspects. For years, market demand had shown that milk was a highly marketable commodity in 
India—urban markets were established to give dairy farmers the confidence to increase their investment. 
Operation Flood tackled the phenomenon of adverse selection—meaning, when access to different 
information leads to poor market choices— with information and incentives (Klitgaard 1997). Starting 
with basic supply and demand fundamentals, architects of Operation Flood continuously analyzed how 
the demand for livestock products was rising and devised a dairying program to supply products to meet 
this demand. Ultimately, the intervention used market incentives and infrastructural development to 
establish a successful new businesses model: cooperatives. Economies of scale, a proven economic 
principle of how costs are minimized as production levels are increased, were also emphasized in the 
design of Operation Flood. A concept behind this dairy intervention that should be learned: production 
can be increased by following market pull and restricting key imports so as not to disrupt domestic 
markets.  27 
Support Collective Action 
Cooperatives and the various innovations that took place throughout Operation Flood also seemed to raise 
awareness of how powerful collective action can be.  Petty political differences were minimized, and a 
spirit of cohesion was strengthened by the cooperatives’ organizational structure. Local ownership—dairy 
producers’ control and ownership of the resources throughout the organizational structure—is partly what 
allowed for this grassroots mobilization to occur. Human resource investments, such as the way in which 
Operation Flood promoted involvement of villagers and community ownership and management of 
cooperatives, are vital if development initiatives are to be successful.   
Adopt Complimentary Crop and Livestock Methods 
Livestock convert useless crop residues and by-products into milk without increasing pressures on the 
land. Therefore, Operation Flood has shown that significant livestock investments can be made without 
interfering with land and resource demands for crop production. Milk production was highly integrated 
into farming and it enabled a virtuous cycle between the dairy system and farming. This method is an 
environmentally sustainable use of energy and nutrients.  
Envision Creative Structures  
The NDDB, through the Operation Flood program, revolutionized the way in which the dairy industry 
was perceived and organized. It concentrated on a single primary product and employed a vertically 
integrated, compact value chain approach encompassing every aspect of the chain from primary producer 
to final consumer. Horizontal integration by bringing inputs, extensions, and services all under the same 
program was also vital, and helped to ensure that the benefits of economies of scale were available and 
directly accessible for each producer. The cooperative infrastructure, significantly expanded and 
strengthened under this program, made adoption and use of products and processes easier for all. For 
example, a strong linkage between milk production enhancement and milk procurement agencies was 
established. Efficiency in the overall organization of milk collection, policymaking, concentrates of cattle 
feed, and other aspects were prioritized.  
Invest in Evaluations  
Analyzing Operation Flood’s impact is difficult because of the numerous problems inherent in the 
program data and evaluations. A lack of data, biased evaluations, and methodological flaws abound when 
reviewing the literature. For example, George stated early on that since milk production in Indian dairy 
comes solely from buffaloes and cows and data on daily milk yields from these animals were missing, it 
was impossible to determine exactly which farmers could participate in Operation Flood (Terhal and 
Doornbos 1983).   
Nevertheless, the WFP’s Terminal Evaluation Report on OF I positively concluded that OF I was 
a successful example of dairy development and in particular of how to effectively use food aid and 
technical assistance for development purposes (FAO 1981).  This evaluation effort was criticized, 
however, for an apparent lack of objectivity. As WFP was asked to assess the program within a month of 
its completion, most of the data collection was by necessity completed by the NDDB and IDC instead of 
an outside independent source. Reports on the impacts of the intervention also tend to be limited and 
inconsistent. One evaluation was completed by a research team based in Bombay, which concluded that 
OF I represented a successful contribution to the development of the Gujerat milk industry but fell short 
as a development mechanism in other areas of India (Centre for Education and Documentation 1982).  
Looked at another way, to what extent was success limited only to Gujarat? Doornbos (1987) also backs 
up the research team’s claim by stating that there are strong regional differences in Operation Flood’s 
overall performance. Additionally, while the EEC and the World Bank have predictably reported 
positively on Operation Flood, an EEC official published a scathing criticism of it, questioning the 28 
impacts and sustainability of the program. Later, another article made it clear that the report was not an 
official EEC report and that the author did not speak on behalf of the EEC. Apparently, both the EEC and 
the World Bank felt positively about Operation Flood because they continued to fund the program for 
several decades.   
While some evaluations of Operation Flood may be faulty, they do not necessarily indicate that 
Operation Flood also was faulty. Several recent publications— including an ex post facto evaluation by 
the World Bank entitled India: The Dairy Revolution, and two longitudinal studies by India’s National 
Council for Applied Economic Research— more thoroughly review and report positively on the 
economic and social aspects of Operation Flood. However, it is true that the lack of independent meta-
evaluations and inconsistencies among research methodologies for micro level impact studies make it 
difficult to know how much impact Operation Flood had on India’s dairy development or food security. 
Studies have to be viewed cautiously because sample sizes may be small or varying, baseline dairy data 
may be missing, some causal factors may be unaccounted for, and poor research designs may influence 
the results (Fulton and Bhargava 1994).  
What can be certain is that Operation Flood laid the foundation for a cooperative movement, 
owned by more than 13 million members today, and ensured these individuals a regular, remunerative 
return on their investments in dairy. Ultimately, this program can be considered a success story because 
Operation Flood was instrumental in augmenting the availability of dairy in India.  Some of the factors 
that contributed to Operation Flood’s success include collective action, extension services, an effective 
use of food aid, the creation of market institutions, a social entrepreneurship of leaders, the use of 
indigenous knowledge, and public policy adjustments. Some of the criticisms, even the extreme ones, 
shed light on the program’s problem areas and provide guidance for future replication of this type of dairy 
scheme.  
Other dairy and agricultural development experts can glean valuable information from these 
lessons. For instance, it is important that the implementation of a successful program in a new 
environment pay special attention to the particularities of that new environment.  Local political, social, 
economic, and environmental dynamics will all play a role in how the intervention is replicated and how 
the intervention impacts the new beneficiaries.  Of the Anand model, the basic objectives, structures, 
functions, and principles can be replicated; however, it is impossible to replicate the exact implementation 
because the sociopolitical desires, bureaucratic procedures, local institutions, and leadership are all 
location-specific and therefore require modifications to the model (Shah 1993).   
For example, the Anand model was successful for dairying precisely because it provided a market 
for rural farmers, but the implementation of the model varied slightly because of the distance between the 
cooperatives and the difference in demand, which was higher in more densely populated areas. This is 
why all managerial and operational processes ought to be synchronized with marketing capabilities before 
the Operation Flood model is employed (Ali and Bhargava 1998). Marketing will not always be the way 
to go: Sri Lanka attempted to redesign their dairy markets based on the cooperative model and wasn’t 
successful.  The same failure is true for the dairy component of the Pakistan Livestock Project, another 
attempt to replicate Operation Flood (Candler and Kumar 1998). Some experts also warn dairy 
development enthusiasts against encouraging demand for a higher-valued good, such as milk, at the 
expense of providing basic nutritional needs. However, looked at another way, the production of rice and 
wheat to feed a population is insufficient to ensure that a population’s basic needs are met—improving 
the purchasing power for villagers is just as vital.  
The timing of an intervention can be an equally important factor in its success as, for example, 
the timing of Operation Flood was critical to its success and long-term political and social sustainability. 
Post-independent India was going through dramatic social changes and the promotion of animal 
husbandry complemented landholding and farming at the time. This environment meant that cooperative 
farming wasn’t a threat, but a desired means of creating space for representative democracy to emerge at 
the village level (Patel 2003). In part, this intervention is also a multiplier effect of the Green Revolution, 
which developed the crop sector and agricultural infrastructure that laid the enabling conditions for dairy 29 
development. For example, improvements in irrigation and fertilizer use that resulted from the Green 
Revolution increased a year-round availability of fodder (Staal, Pratt, and Jabbar 2008a, 2008b).  
To claim that Operation Flood is a panacea for the development ills of India, or even that it is the 
best approach for developing a dairy industry, would be short-sighted; however, it has undeniably 
impacted India’s rural development in a positive way Lessons from Operation Flood are vital given the 
recent focus on livestock products as a means of addressing protein and micronutrient deficiencies in 
developing countries. Fortunately, in many countries, demand for livestock products is rapidly growing, 
and this livestock revolution not only allows smallholder farmers to benefit economically from expanding 
markets but also provides their families with energy-dense calories and micronutrients. Failure to act 
could promote that this revolution be of such a manner to not promote poverty alleviation, enhanced 
nutrition and health and environmental preservation (Delgado 2003). Specifically, market-oriented milk 
production has proven to be a key income-generating livestock activity available to poor and marginal 
households. It generates a steady flow of income and also has been shown to play a role in capital 
accumulation among resource-poor households, which fosters their investments in education as well as 
other productive activities and assets. Oftentimes, women of the household are the ones accruing this 
income and a subsequent positive investment in child welfare and nutrition can be observed (Staal, Pratt 
and Jabbar 2008).  
Overall, regarding the lessons gleaned from Operation Flood, the message to the world is one of 
guarded optimism (Scholten and Basu 2009, Hindu Business Line 2009). New challenges, such as rising 
competition from investor-owned firms will continue to emerge and must be addressed. However, at the 
end of the day, Operation Flood established a reliable, profit-generating market for smallholder farmers 
that engendered confidence and increased investment in the dairy sector: the result was an expansion of 
production and improved productivity to meet the growing demand for dairy and in turn, enhance the 
dietary quality of millions of Indians who could not consume greater quantities of milk and milk products.  30 
ANNEX 1. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PERFORMED BY STATE IN ‘000, 1991-2006 










1999- 2000  2001- 2002  2003- 2004  2005- 2006 
Andhra 
Pradesh  
1,564   1,701   1,747   2,045   2,328   2,670   3,104   3,404  
Arunachal 
Pradesh  
3   1   2   3   -   -   -   -  
Assam   127   50   -   28   35   91   109   -  
Bihar   828   661   -   -   13   26   59   -  
Goa   7   8   -   -   7   9   11   10  
Gujarat   501   488   1,613   1,528   540   645   717   578  
Haryana   713   700   654   609   475   802   935   1,422  
Himachal 
Pradesh  
263   269   335   325   412   394   419   498  
Jammu & 
Kashmir  
223   230   -   -   147   160   207   -  
Karnataka   1,167   1,380   2,033   2,074   1,533   1,867   2,108   -  
Kerala   1,367   1,353   1,240   1,200   3,641   1,249   1,231   -  
Madhya 
Pradesh  
349   355   305   189   265   292   398   597  
Maharashtra   1,387   1,700   1,779   1,671   1,944   1,960   3,425   -  
Manipur   7   8   11   12   13   15   40   -  
Meghalaya   15   20   24   22   20   29   26   26  
Mizoram   2   1   10   10   4   6   5   5  
Nagaland   5   5   5   8   3   5   30   -  
Orissa   262   319   535   1,000   478   334   497   654  
Punjab   989   1,168   1,377   1,909   2,108   2,229   3,012   2,834  
Rajasthan   501   583   -   -   638   638   877   1,057  
Sikkim   7   1   1   2   -   -   -   -  
Tamilnadu   2,274   2,524   2,573   2,682   3,147   3,235   3,102   3,287  
Tripura   42   50   63   70   65   63   66   78  
Uttar Pradesh   2,638   2,932   3,055   2,651   2,498   1,703   1,784   2,334  
West Bengal   634   690   701   628   744   1,006   1,183   -  
A & N Island   1   2   4   4   5   7   9   -  
Chandigarh   9   10   10   10   10   10   8   9  
D & N Haveli   1   1   1   1   -   -   -   -  
Daman & Diu   0   0   0   0   -   -   -   -  
Delhi   0   0   0   0   12   12   14   16  
Lakshadweep   17   17   17   18   0.411   0.5   0.55   0.6  
Pondicherry   87   89   90   94   89   96   80   -  
Chhattisgarh           85    122  270  - 
Uttaranchal          -  92  109  - 
Jharkhand                 
Total  15,990  17,316  18,185  18,793  21,260  19,766  23,835  16,809 
Sources : Basic Animal Husbandry Statistics 1999, 2002, and 2006.  
Notes: To indicate that data was not available, the symbol (-) has been used. 31 
ANNEX 2. INDIA AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY STATISTICS 
Indicator  Statistic   Citation 
Total population (billion)   1.13  Banerjee 2007  
Village dwellers (percent)   70  Banerjee 2007  
Agricultural population with dairy animals (million)   350  Banerjee 2007  
Rural milk producers (million)   70  Banerjee 2007  
Milk produced rurally (percent)   90  Banerjee 2007  
Small, marginal and landless milk producer households (millions)   52  Banerjee 2007  
Small, marginal and landless milk producers (percent)   75  Banerjee 2007  
OF households with small and marginal farmers (percent)   72  Shah 1993  
OF households of backward classes (percent)   73  Shah 1993  
Dairy contribution to gross income for rural producers(percent)   25  Shah 1993  
Dairy contribution to gross income for landless household (percent)   50  Shah 1993  
Women members of dairy cooperatives (millions)   3.3  Patel 2007  
Female dairy cooperative membership (percent)   29  Patel 2007   
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